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ABSTRACT 
Nowadays, it is widely recognized that data security will play a central role in the design of 
IT devices. There are more than billion wireless users by now; it faces a growing need for 
security of embedded applications. 
This thesis focuses on the basic concept; properties and performance of symmetric and 
asymmetric cryptosystems. In this thesis, different encryption and decryption algorithms 
have been implemented on embedded systems. Moreover, the execution time and power 
consumption of each cryptography method have been evaluated as key performance 
indicators. CAESAR and AES are implemented for the microcontroller (ATmega8515). 
The STK 500 board is used for programming of the ATmega8515. Furthermore it is used 
for the communication between the microcontroller and PC to obtain the performance 
advantages of the cryptography methods. Time and power consumption are measured by 
using an oscilloscope and a multimeter. Furthermore the performance of different  
cryptography methods are compared. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
KEYWORDS: Cryptography, Embedded System, AES, ECC, security, encryption, 
decryption 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The embedded systems and handheld devices have been widely developed in 
comparison to a few years ago. From video equipment to mp3 players, cars to smart 
phones, and washing machines to home thermostats, more and more embedded devices 
interact with the real world and are connected to the internet, and then it’s very common 
that those devices meet attacks, hackers and threats. Security issues might result in 
physical side effect as potential damages, personal injury, and even death, so it will play 
a central role in the design of future IT systems. 
Due to the rapid growth of network communication, embedded devices and other 
transactions face the challenge of an increasing demand of data security, which concerns 
authentication for user admission, intrusion detection as well as any forms of attacks. 
Therefore, the security requirements have become critical. The main security issues of 
embedded systems will encounter when the data is routed over communication channels 
such as Ethernet, Wi-Fi, WiMAX or Bluetooth. Unfortunately, the technology of 
security applied in desk computing and enterprise cannot be executed in embedded 
systems. But security issues for embedded systems are more than the problems being 
addressed for desktop computing. 
The possibility of adding security can be specified by hardware or by implementing the 
cryptography algorithms in software. This project focuses on cryptography and the 
9 
 
implementation of a cryptographic algorithm to protect data by using encryption 
technology on embedded systems. 
There are several requirements and challenges of the implementation of cryptography 
algorithms on embedded systems. Embedded systems are highly cost sensitive, the 
length of cryptography key cannot be too big; a slow running cryptographic algorithm 
will lead to a long waiting time. The cryptographic technology can be divided into the 
two most common algorithmic models: symmetric cipher model and asymmetric-key. 
Asymmetric-key algorithms are very computationally intensive compared to symmetric-
key operations. Sufficient cryptographic algorithms need to be selected according to the 
hardware and processor of the embedded systems. 
The thesis consists of six chapters. In the first three chapters, the theory of cryptosystem 
is explained, symmetric cryptography and asymmetric cryptography. Chapter four 
introduces several attack methods. After the theoretical introduction it follows the most 
significant part of the thesis, the experimental part. Chapter five describes the software 
and hardware for the implementation, as well as the implementation algorithms, result 
and analysis of the encryption and decryption. Conclusion and future development 
regarding to this topic is given in the last chapter “CONCLUSION AND FUTURE 
WORK”. 
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2. SYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHY 
Symmetric encryption is also known as conventional encryption or single-key 
encryption. The encryption and decryption processes are performed by using the same 
key. It contains five elements: Plaintext, Encryption Algorithm, Private Key, Ciphertext 
and Decryption Algorithm, as the symmetric cryptosystem model is showed in Figure 1. 
This system requires a strong encryption algorithm and the security of the private key. 
 
Figure 1. Simplified model of symmetric cryptosystem (Stallings 2011: 57). 
2.1. Block Cipher Principles 
Block Cipher is a type of symmetric encryption/decryption scheme that transform a 
fixed-length block of plaintext into a ciphertext block of the same length. The encryption 
transformation process is under the use-provided private key (See Figure 2). Decryption 
is the inverse process of encryption to the ciphertext using the same private key and will 
result in the original plaintext which was encrypted. Typically the block size is 64 bits or 
128 bits. 
11 
 
 
Figure 2. Block Cipher (Stallings 2011: 93). 
There are many common block ciphers in use today. These are outlined in Table 1.  
Table 1. Common Block Cipher Features (Ian McCombe 2007). 
Name Block Size (bits) Key Size (bits) Year 
Developed 
DES 64 56 1975 
RC2 64 8-128(default 64) 1987 
AES 128 128,196 or 256 1998 
IDEA 64 128 1991 
Lucifer 48 48 1971 
BlowFish 64 32-448(default 
128) 
1993 
Intel Cascaded Cipher 128 128 2006 
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2.2. Data Encryption Standard (DES) 
The Data Encryption Standard is adopted in 1977 by the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST), and the most widely used encryption scheme is based on it. The 
encryption process of DES is to transform a 64-bit input in a series of steps into a 64-bit 
output within a 56-bit key. The same key is used for the decryption process. 
In Figure 3, the first step is permutation and the last step is inverse permutation, after 
permutation, the block is broken into two 32 bits blocks, the left one is 
iL  and the right 
part is
iR . Then there are 16 rounds of identical operations, but each of them uses an 
individual key
iK 1:  ii RL ),(: ,11 iiii KRfLR        (1)  
In decoding, ),(:,: 11 iiiiii KLfRLLR         (2) 
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Figure 3. DES working process (Martti 2009:22). 
Traditional DES has only 56 keys and therefore it does not meet the requirements of the 
current distributed open network data encryption security. DES is considered as unsafe 
after increasing of the clock rate of the computer. 
2.3. Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is the most popular and secure symmetric system 
used in the professional industrial application, which is intended to replace DES for 
commercial applications. AES is a specification for encryption of the electronic data and 
it was published in 2001 by the National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST). 
AES is the first publicly accessible and open cipher approved by the National Security 
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Agency (NSA) for the top secure information. In Comparison to AES, DES is insecure 
due to the small key. (Wikipedia AES 2012a.) 
Sometimes the algorithm is called Rijndael, which is combined by the names of the two 
Belgian cryptographers, Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen. The basic structure of AES 
is substitution-permutation network, which can work fast on both software and hardware. 
The cipher takes the plaintext block size of 128 bits. The key sizes can be 128, 192 or 
256 bits. (Wikipedia AES 2012a.) 
AES operates on a 4×4 square matrix of bytes. This block is termed into the State array, 
and the AES cipher consists of a number of repetitions of transformation rounds, where 
the number of rounds depends on the key length (Table 2). 
Table 2. Round and key length. 
No. of rounds Key Length (bytes) 
10 16 
12 24 
14 32 
The overall AES algorithm structure can be divided in the following steps as shown in 
Figure 4, which models the whole process of the AES encryption and decryption and 
indicates the sequence of the transformation in each round. 
15 
 
 
Figure 4. AES Encryption and Decryption (Stallings 2011: 178). 
Refer to the Figure 4, the process of each steps can be listed as: 
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1) Key Expansion. 
AES processes the data block as a single matrix during each round using substitutions 
and permutations. Round keys are derived from cipher key which is expanded into an 
array of forty-four 32-bit words. 
2) Initial Transformation. 
A simple bitwise XOR is applied to each byte of the state and the portion of the 
expanded key. 
3) Rounds. 
Four different stages are used; one of permutation and the others are substitution: 
Substitute Byte 
ShiftRows 
 MixColumn  
AddRoundKey. 
 Those four stages are repeating each round except the final round. 
4) Final Round (no MixColumn) 
The final round of both encryption and decryption consist three stages: 
Substitute Byte 
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ShiftRows 
AddRoundKey.  
 
Figure 5. SubBytes step (Wikipedia AES 2012a). 
Substitute Byte—each byte is replaced with another one according to an S-box (in 
APPENDIX 1), it is a non-linear substitution step shown in Figure 5. The element      
is replaced by the      using the S-box. The S-box contains all possible 256 2-byte 
values for permutation. The substitution process is working in the following way: the 
left side byte is used as row value and the right side byte is used as column number. 
Then lookup the S-box within these row and column values to pick another 2-byte 
output value. 
 iiji aSb ,,            (3) 
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Galois Field is called finite field, which is a field that contains a finite number of 
elements. The method of S-box substitution is based on the property of GF ( 82 ), the 
addition in GF ( 82 ) is XOR. 
1) Inverse in GF( 82 ), as the input element ωϵGF( 82 ), the inverse element of ω  is 
X: 
X= 






00
02541


        (4) 
2) Then the sub element of X form byte to bits are ( 01234567 ,,,,,,, xxxxxxxx ), 
According to (Stallings 2011: 178) the transformation is: 
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ShiftRows—is the row forward shift process. The first row remains the same. For the 
second row, shift to left 1-byte circular. For the third row, shift to left 2-byte circular. 
Then the fourth row, shift to left 3-byte circular. 
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The transformation can be expressed as: 
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The whole process is represented in Figure 6 clearly. 
 
Figure  6. Shift Rows (Wikipedia AES 2012a). 
MixColumn—is a forward mix column transformation. The mathematical model of 
intermixing between the different columns is in order to reach the confusion of the 
encrypted order. The whole process can be defined by the following mathematical model: 
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AddRoundKey—is a forward and inverse transformation. This step is the process that 
128 bits of the state are bitwise XORed with the 128bit of the round key. The 
mathematic model can be expressed as: 

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Refer to Figure 7; the detail of the transformation process is represented. 
 
Figure 7. AddRoundKey (Wikipedia AES 2012a). 
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The algorithm for decryption makes use of the expanded key in reverse order. The step 
AddRoundKey is the same as in encryption. However, the decryption algorithm is no 
identical to the encryption algorithm. All the four stages are reversible, and encryption 
and decryption are going in opposite vertical directions. 
2.4. Pseudorandom Number Generation and Stream Ciphers 
The real random number (or random events) in a generating process is according to the 
experimental performance of distribution probability, the result is unpredictable, is not 
visible. The pseudorandom number is generated according to a certain algorithm 
simulation, the sequences of numbers that are not statistically random. And the result is 
certain and visible. 
Random numbers are widely used in cryptography based on a number of network 
security algorithms and protocols.  There are some random and pseudorandom number 
generators. TRNG is the true random number generator. It is the source of true analog 
randomness to a binary output. PRNG is a pseudorandom number generator. PRF is a 
pseudorandom function. Those two generators are used to produce pseudorandom 
numbers. Both require a fixed value as input, called the seed that should be different 
every time to guarantee randomness and unpredictability.  
2.5.  Blowfish 
Blowfish is a substitute for the DES and IDEA encryption algorithm. It is a symmetrical 
block cipher (secret or private key), use that a variable key length from 32 to 448 bits. 
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(The U.S. government prohibits the encryption output software to use the key which 
key-length is more than 40, unless special-purpose software). Blowfish algorithm is an 
alternative encryption method, proposed in 1993 by Bruce Schneier. After the birth of 
the 32-bit processor, the speed of blowfish algorithm in the encryption beyond the DES 
attracted the attention of the people. Blowfish is a not registered patent, it can be used 
free. The round function is shown in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. The round functions of Blowfish. 
There are some features of blowfish: 
 Blowfish is fast 
 Blowfish needs only 5 KB of memory is easy to implement and compact 
 Blowfish is considered secure 
 Encryption consist 16+1 phases, each phase consists of ⊕, + and S-box operation 
 Decryption is identical to encryption; keys are used in inverse order. (Martti 
2009:35.) 
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3. ASYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHY 
Asymmetric cryptography is also known as public-key cryptography, which is a form of 
a cryptosystem in which encryption and decryption are performed by different keys. 
There is one public key and one private key. The public key is widely distributed, while 
the private key is kept secure. 
 
Figure  9. Simplified model of asymmetric cryptography (Information Security). 
The process of asymmetric cryptography is to transform the plaintext into ciphertext by 
using the public key of the receiver (see Figure 9). The receiver decrypts the ciphertext 
with the private key. Anyone who wants to send a message to Alice can encrypt it using 
Alice’s public key but only Alice can decrypt it with her private key. The private key 
should be kept secret at all times.  
The use of public-key cryptosystem can be divided into three categories: Encryption/ 
decryption; digital signature; key exchange. (Stallings 2011: 57.) 
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3.1. The RSA algorithm 
RSA is one kind of public-key algorithm; it stands for Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len 
Adleman who first publicly described it in 1978. 
The RSA scheme is a block cipher in which the plaintext and ciphertext are integers 
between 0 and n-1 for some n. The public key is created and published by the product of 
two large prime numbers, along with an auxiliary value. The prime factors must be kept 
secret. Anyone can use the public key to encrypt a message, only someone with 
knowledge of the prime factors can feasibly decode the message. At present RSA is the 
most widely used public key cryptography, which is based on the principle of trapdoor 
one-way function, as it is shown in the Figure 10,  
 
Figure 10. RSA is based on trapdoor one-way function principle.  
The RSA algorithm is simple and easy to use. But as decomposition method of big 
integers is progressing, and the improvement of the speed of the computers and the 
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development of computer networks, the key length has to be increased in order to 
guarantee the safety of RSA. Increasing the key length will slow down the encryption 
and decryption speed. Hardware based implementation would be difficult. Thus RSA 
will be limited in terms of the key length. 
Compared to DES, the speed of RSA is 1000 times slower than DES in hardware. In 
software, RSA is 100 times slower than DES. Those numbers might be changed slightly 
as technology changes, but the speeds of RSA can never approach the symmetric 
algorithms. Refer to the Table 3, it shows RSA speeds for different modulus lengths 
with 8-bit public key. 
Table 3. RSA Speeds for Different Modulus Lengths with an 8-bit Public Key  
(J.B.Lacy 1993). 
 512 bits 768 bits 1,024 bits 
Encrypt 0.03 sec 0.05 sec 0.08 sec 
Decrypt 0.16 sec 0.48 sec 0.93 sec 
Sign 0.16 sec 0.52 sec 0.97 sec 
Verify 0.02 sec 0.07 sec 0.08 sec 
3.2. Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange 
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange is a security protocol. The math method is simple. Alice 
and Bob can use this algorithm to generate a secret key. First, Alice and Bob agree on a 
large prime, n and g, g < n and g is a primitive root of n. These two integers don’t need 
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to be secret; Alice and Bob can agree to them over some insecure channels, which even 
are common among a group of users. 
The algorithm works as follows: 
(1) Alice Key Generation: 
ngX x mod , x is a large random integer 
(2) Bob Key Generation: 
ngY y mod , y is a large random integer 
(3) Calculation of secret key by Alice: 
nYk x mod  
(4) Calculation of secret key by Bob: 
nXk y mod'   
Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol can easily be extended to work with more people, 
just add more people and more rounds of computations. 
This algorithm is not suitable for embedded systems. It can be used for the key 
distribution. Both sides can use this algorithm to generate a secret key, but it cannot be 
used for encryption and decryption of the message. (Stallings 2011: 327.) 
3.3. El GAMAL Cryptographic System 
The ElGamal algorithm is public-key cryptography which is based on Diffie-Hellman 
key exchange. ElGamal contains key generation, encryption algorithm and decryption 
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algorithm which were described by Taher Elgamal in 1984. It can be used for both 
digital signature and message encryption.  
Key generation  
Alice generates a key pair, first two random numbers are chosen, g and x; a prime p, g 
and x are smaller than p. 
Alice computes pgy x mod , the public key is y, g and p, can be shared among groups 
of users. And x is kept private. 
ElGamal Encryption 
Plaintext is M, a random number k is chosen, k is relatively prime of p-1. 
a, b are ciphertexts, the length is two times of plaintext, 
)(mod pga k            (9) 
)(mod pMyb k          (10) 
Decrypting: )(mod/ pabM x        (11) 
ElGamal Signatures 
The signing message is M, a random number k is chosen, k is relatively prime of p-1, 
M= (ax+bk) mod (p-1)        (12) 
This signature is the pair a and b. The value of k should be kept private. 
Verifying: )(mod)(mod pgpay Mba        (13) 
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Table 4. Gives some sample software speed of ElGamal (J.B.Lacy 1993). 
 512 bits 768 bits 1024 bits 
Encrypt 0.33 sec 0.80 sec 1.09 sec 
Decrypt 0.24 sec 0.58 sec 0.77 sec 
Sign 0.25 sec 0.47 sec 0.63 sec 
Verify 1.37 sec 5.12 sex 9.30 sec 
Table 4 shows that ElGamal when comparing the measurement with Table 3 is slower 
than RSA. 
3.4. Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem 
In 1985, Miller and Koblitz firstly suggested to use Elliptic Curve in cryptography 
independently, which is based on the algebraic structure of elliptic curves over finite 
fields. Elliptic Curves are becoming more popular is because the keys size is much 
shorter than the public key systems which are based on the integer factorization or finite 
field discrete logarithm problem. Compared to RSA, the security level of ECC is higher. 
A key of 160 bits in ECC is secure as a 1024 bits RSA key as shown in Table 5. As a 
result, due to the short key length, the elliptic curve cryptosystem needs less bandwidth, 
less running time as well as lower power cost and it is suitable for the development of 
security products like PDA, mobile phone and embedded card .It will replace RSA in the 
near future. ECC becomes one of most efficient public-key cryptosystem. 
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Table 5. Key length of ECC and RSA with same security level. 
ECC key length 
(bits) 
RSA key length 
(bits) 
Crack Time /MIPS 
(year) 
ECC/RSA key 
length rate 
106 512 410  5:1 
160 1024 1110  7:1 
210 2048 2010  10:1 
600 21000 7810  35:1 
In general, cubic equations for elliptic curves take the Weierstrass equation: 
edxcxxbyaxyy  232                                                                                   (14) 
Where a, b, c, d, e are real numbers and x, y take the values of real numbers. The elliptic 
curve can be seen as a set of all solutions to equations of the form: 
baxxy  32                           (15) 
The curve discriminant equation is: =-16( 23 274 ba  )                                              (16) 
A group can be defined on a set E (a, b) for specific values of a and b in Equation (14), 
the following condition is met: 
0274 23  ba                                                                                                                 (17) 
The process of ECC Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange can be done by the following step. 
First pick a large integer q, which is a prime or an integer of the form of m2 . Then the 
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elliptic curve parameters a, b must be applied for Equation (14) or (15), which defines 
the elliptic group of the points ),( baEq . In the next step a base point G= ( 11, yx ) in 
),( baEq is selected, whose order is larger than value n.  
A key exchange between user Alice and Bob can be described in Figure 11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.  ECC Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (Stallings 2011: 343). 
ECC Encryption and Decryption  
                                        User Alice Key Generation 
Select private An                                                          nnA   
Calculate public AP      GnP AA   
 
 
                                        User Bob Key Generation 
Select private Bn                                                          nnB   
Calculate public BP      GnP BB   
 Calculation of Secret Key by User Alice 
BA PnK   
Calculation of Secret Key by User Bob 
AB PnK   
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Choose Elliptic curve over GF ( m2 ) for instant, the preparation assignments are: 
 Select GF(p) 
 Select elliptic curve E 
 Select base point G(x,y) 
 Applied algorithm for transforming plaintext into the points of elliptic curve, called 
encryption process 
 Generating the private and public keys between sender Alice and receiver Bob. 
Select one private key n, calculate the public key ),( yxnnGP  . For Alice, the 
private key is An , and the public key is ),( yxnGnP AAA  . For Bob, the private 
key is Bn and the public key is ),( yxnGnP BBB  . 
Encryption: Alice sends encrypted message to Bob 
 Choose random number k, 11  pk  
 Get the corresponding points ),( mm yx  by encoding the plaintext; 
 Calculate the cipher text }),(),,({ Bmmm kPyxyxkC  , and the cipher text here 
turns into two points on the elliptic curve. 
Decryption, Bob decrypts the received message from Alice: 
 Calculation 
),(
),(),(),(
)),(())),((),((
)()),((
mm
BBmm
BBmm
BBmm
yx
yxknyxknyx
yxknyxnkyx
kGnkPyx




     (18) 
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 Get the corresponding plaintext by decoding the points ),( mm yx . 
The study and implementation of elliptic curve cryptography is now becoming a focus in 
public-key cryptosystems, and its foundation relies on the difficulty to solve the discrete 
logarithm of the elliptic curve Abelian group. 
The set of points on the elliptic curve, together with a special point O called the point at 
infinity can be equipped with an Abelian group structure by the following addition 
operation. 
Additional algorithm: 
Input:   modulus p, integer ]1[,  pba  
Output: c=(a+b) mod p 
000 bac   
For i from 1 to t-1 do: carrybac  111  
If carry =1, then c=c-p 
If pc  , then c=c-p 
Return (c) 
Subtraction algorithm 
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Input:   modulus p, integer ]1[,  pba  
Output: c= (a+b) mod p 
000 bac   
For i from 1 to t-1 do: carrybac  111  
If carry =1, then c=c+p 
Return (c) 
3.5. Hash Functions 
A hash function is any algorithm that maps large data sets of variable lengths to smaller 
fixed length data sets. For instance, an address name, having a variable length, could be 
hashed to a single integer. The values returned by a hash function are called hash values, 
hash codes, hash sums, checksums or simply hashes. 
Some common uses hash functions: 
Mxxf maxmod:)(            (19) 
When max (M) is a prime and normal not close to n2 ; 
MlongitXxtruncxf maxmod)max*)max/((:)(         (20) 
This is used for integer; 
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)1000000mod)1000*(:)( xdivxxf         (21) 
First Square meter then get the middle value. 
In original sense, good hash functions are usually required to meet certain properties 
listed below: 
Determinism--the hash procedure must be deterministic. It means for a given input value 
the output hash value must be the same. 
Uniformity-- A good hash function should map the expected inputs as evenly as possible 
over its output range. That is, every hash value in the output range should be generated 
with roughly the same probability. 
Variable range—in many applications, the hash function range may be different for each 
run of the program. 
Variable range with minimal movement—the hash table is refers to a dynamic hash table 
when the hash function is used to store values in a hash table that outlives the run of the 
program, and the hash table needs to be expanded or shrunk. 
Data normalization—accomplishes normalizing the input before hashing it. That is, any 
two inputs that are considered equivalent must yield the same hash value. 
Continuity—Hash function is used for searching similar data, which must be as 
continuous as possible. 
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3.6.  Key Management and Distribution 
Key management includes key generation, storage, distribution, using and destroy. The 
main target is to make sure that the key delivery via the public network is safely. A good 
key management system should include three aspects: 
 Keys are hard to be stolen 
 Under certain conditions, it should be useless to steal the keys because they have a 
limited lifetime 
 Key distribution and exchange process are transparent to the users; users don’t need 
to manage the keys personally.  
The key distribution is the way that delivers a key to two parties who are intended to 
exchange secure encrypted data. A protocol is needed that provides a secure distribution 
of the keys. There are two kinds’ keys that are involved in key distribution. Master keys 
are infrequently used and they last for a long time. The other is session keys, which are 
generated and distributed for temporary use between two parties.  
Key distribution technique is a term that refers to the means of delivering a key between 
two parties that want to exchange data without allowing others to see the key.  So far, 
the two main techniques are described Key Distribution Centre (KDC) and Diffie-
Hellman. The process of Diffie-Hellman is described in chapter 3.2.  
Kerberos is an authentication service designed for key distribution environment, it 
applies symmetric cryptography algorithms to establish a trustable third party KDC 
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verification system and verifies the authenticity of the two parties that communication 
with each other. The main function of Kerberos is to solve the key management and 
distribution. There are three parties in this communication: two communication parties 
that need to be verified and a trustable third party (KDC). Each party should only keep 
the encryption key with KDC secure, and KDC will safeguard the different encryption 
keys for individual users. When two parties want to communicate, they apply to KDC 
and KDC will encrypt the session keys by their individual keys .Then keys will be sent 
back (Stallings 2011: 435).The process is illustrated in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12. Key Distribution Scenario (Stallings 2011: 439). 
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3.7. User Authentication 
In most computer security contents, user authentication is a mean of identifying the user 
and verifying that the user is allowed to access some strict network. For example, a user 
must be identified as a particular student to access the universities weboodi system or 
webmail service. A user must be identified as a member of IEEE to in order to view the 
IEEE materials. Furthermore, a user must be identified as a system administrator in 
order to access the document about the network administration. User authentication is 
the basis for access control and for user accountability. 
There are two steps for remote user authentication: 
 Identification step: Presenting an identifier to the security network, like user name 
and password. 
 Verification step: Server and database. Generate authentication information to 
confirm the user’s access right. 
There are four possibilities that can be used individually or together to authenticate the 
users. 
 Individual knows: A password, a PIN, or answers to a prearranged set of questions. 
 Individual possesses: Tokens, like cryptography keys, smart cards, physical keys 
and electronic keys. 
 Static biometrics: Fingerprint, face and retina. 
 Dynamic biometrics: Voice pattern and handwriting characteristics 
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The remote User-authentication can be divided into two methods: mutual authentication 
and one-way authentication. Mutual authentication should consider the key distribution 
issues and should enable two communication parties to satisfy themselves mutually 
about the other’s identity; one-way authentication can be applied for the e-mail system. 
A Remote user authentication can use symmetric encryption and asymmetric encryption 
with Kerberos service. 
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4. ATTACKS 
Attacks can be active or passive. An ‘active attack’ attempts to delete, add or use other 
method to affect the channel. A ‘passive attack’ only monitors the channel, does not 
affect the system resources. 
Types of attacks: 
 Passive Attack 
 Within ciphertext: attempts to get secret key or plaintext by observing 
ciphertext 
 Knows some plaintext and relative ciphertext, but this attack it difficult to 
realize 
 Knows some plaintext, attempts to know the encryption algorithms 
 Choosing relative plaintext to attack 
 Choosing ciphertext to attack 
 Choosing relative ciphertext to attack 
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Refer to Figure 13, which is shown the four attacks on Four Levels: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Four different levels attack. 
Refer to the elliptic curve cryptosystem; most attacks on ECC are focusing on 
algorithms. 
4.1. Attacks on Hardware and Network  
It can be realized by a Side-Channel Attack (SCA), this method is powerful because 
there is no unified counter plan. SCA can be classified by invasive attacks and non-
invasive attacks. Invasive attacks include probing and fault induction attacks. Non-
invasive attacks include timing attacks and leaked-information attacks. 
Attacks on Mechanisms 
Attacks on Protocols 
Attacks on Hardware and Network 
Attacks on algorithm 
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4.1.1. Power Consumpution and Electromagetic Radiation Attack 
In this kind of attack, the rival get system leaked information by means of measures or 
by analyzing the switch, current and power. Those information include hamming 
distance, bit string and operation order. Some attacks can even get the RAM information 
via CPU RAM address. 
Similar, they can get the information via the equipment’s electromagetic radiation. 
Because of electromagnetic radiation, an attacker can get data without getting close to 
the equipment. 
4.1.2. Time Attacks 
The target of time attack is a computational process nD,  where n is fixed, and where D 
is a rational point on the elliptic curve.This kind of attack is to analyse the selected time. 
The principle is that for a software or a device, different input consumes time differently. 
In theory, time randomization and process interrupt randomization are the ways to resist 
timimg attack. But in practice, those method are too strict, there is no perfect resist 
method. 
4.1.3. Fault Induction Attacks 
Fault Induction Attacks is to do wrong operation deliberately, get the secure information 
from the output result. 
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The method for assist this attack is simple, examine intermediate result. If the 
intermediate result not belongs to the curve point group, recalculate it. 
4.1.4. Some Possible Countermeasures 
 Non area differentiation in basic operation, at least make operation atomic; 
 Group randomized, at least for base point; 
 Check if the intermediate result is reasonable; 
 Well stored precomputation result in hard disk; 
 Electromagnetic shielding; 
 Random process interrupt, random timing. (Avanzi 2005.) 
4.2.  Attacks on Algorithm 
These kind attacks mostly rely on the mathematical algorithm, for ECC, it will aim to 
attack the ECC discrete logarithm ECDLP.  Because of the features of ECC are 
complicated and attractive, it can be observed from different angles and get different 
properties. Meanwhile, the attacker obtains ideas from its characters. 
4.2.1. Uncivilized search 
Uncivilized search on elliptic curve is : a given curve E, point P and a random point Q, 
calculate P, 2P, 3P…until get Q=IP. The worst situation of this algorithm needs process 
n times elliptic curve addition, complexity is O(n). 
43 
 
4.2.2.  Pohlig-Hellman algorithm 
This algorithm makes use of factorization. By means of factoring n, the ECDLP how to 
solve l change into how to solve all the prime factors of n. Then regain l by CRT. 
In order to withstand this attack, when we choose elliptic curve, the curve degree should 
be aliquot of a big prime n or be a big prime. 
4.2.3.  Baby-step Giant-step algorithm (BSGS) 
We describe the BSBG method for a general finite abelian group, with n elements. By 
the Pohlig-Hellman simplification it can be assumed that n is prime. This method is the 
improvement of uncivilized search, but it costs more Random Access Memory (RAM). 
By means of precalculated and store the number of n elliptic curve points, the 
complexity of the worse situation can be decreased to O ( n ) Pollard Rho Method. And 
the main problem of the method is that the storage space of O ( n ) group elements. 
This method in practice is a way of integer generation, and can be used for big integer 
factorization. When solving the ECDLP problem, Pollard Rho method simplify Baby-
step Giant-step which saves memory space. After this improvement, the complexity of 
this method is around O (
2
n ). Based on this method, it is possible to parallelize 
Pollard Pho method, arithmetic complexity decreased to O (
r
n
2
 ) 
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4.2.4. Semaev Smart Satoh Araki Attack 
Prime Field Anomalous can solve ECDLP quickly. But this attack won’t diffuse to other 
infinite field. It is to solve the ECDLP in subgroups of order p, where p is the 
characteristic of the field of the definition of the curve. An attack can be avoided by 
checking if the infinite element numbers are equal to the elliptic curve point members. 
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5. EXPERIMENTAL PART 
In the experimental part, the content is about simulation regarding to security and 
performance on CAESAR and AES. 
5.1. Hardware for Simulations 
The STK500 board is manufactured by ATMEL in Sweden and it is equipped with an 
ATmega8515 microcontroller (see Figure 14), starter kit for 8-bit AVR. These 
microcontrollers are available in different configurations. It consists of a RS-232 
interface to PC for programming and control, an additional RS-232 port for general use. 
It works with a regular power supply for 10-15V DC power.  
 
 
Figure 14. ATMEL STK 500. 
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The key features of STK500 I used are listed below: 
 RS232 Interface to PC for programming and control 
 Regulated power supply for 10-15V DC power 
 Sockets for 8-pin, 20-pin, 28-pin, and 40-pin AVR devices 
 Parallel and Serial High-Voltage Programming of AVR devices 
 Serial In-System Programming (ISP) of AVR devices 
 In-System Programmer for Programming AVR devices in External Target 
System 
 8 Push-buttons for general use 
 8 LEDS for general use 
 All I/O ports easily accessible through pin header connectors 
 Additional RS232 port for general use 
 Expansion connectors for plug-in modules and prototyping area 
And the key Parameter Value of the chipcon is listed below: 
 Flash (Kbytes): 8 Kbytes 
 Pin Count: 44 
 Max. Operating Frequency: 16 MHz 
 CPU: 8-bit AVR 
 # of Touch Channels: 16 
 Hardware QTouch Acquisition: No 
 Max I/O Pins: 35 
 Ext Interrupts: 3 
 USB Speed: No 
 USB Interface: No 
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Figure 15. STK 500 Components (ATMEL User guide). 
5.2. Software used for implementation and for testing 
The software which is used to program the microcontroller on STK500 development 
board is Atmel Studio 6.0. Realterm is used for the communication between the PC and 
the microcontroller. The FrontPage of Atmel Studio 6.0 is shown in Figure 16.  
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Figure 16.  AtmelStudio 6.0 FrontPage. 
The experiment will be done with Realterm, which is created mostly to represent a better 
alternative to the ubiquitous HyperTerminal application. In this project, the most 
impressive part of this application is the fact that it can emulate almost any kind of 
terminal used for serial communication. The FrontPage of Realterm is shown in Figure 
17. 
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Figure 17. The Realterm FrontPage.  
5.3. Selection and Implementation of Cryptographic Algorithms  
The experiment is done with three programs containing the implementations of 
cryptography algorithms CAESAR and AES. The procedure is shown in Figure 18. 
First the program that contains the selected crypto graphical algorithms is compiled and 
uploaded to the microcontroller. This is done with Atmel AVR studio. In this case serial 
cable must be connected with the programming port of the STK500 board. Then the 
serial cable must be connected with the communication serial port in order to 
communicate with the microcontroller over the Realterm software. 
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In Figure 18, the STK 500 is connected to the PC via RS232 port. There are two RS232 
ports on STK 500, one is for programming which is occupied when using Atmel studio 
6.0; the other one is for communication when communicates with Realterm. 
 
Figure 18. Schematic Diagram. 
A. CAESAR 
CAESAR encryption (Caesar cipher), known as shift cipher, is the simplest encryption 
method. It is a type of substitution cipher in which each letter in the plaintext is replaced 
by a letter some fixed number of positions down the alphabet. Each letter in the alphabet 
will be replaced with a constants right shift k.  
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Figure 19. CAESAR letter left shift of 3 (Wikipedia CAESAR 2013). 
See Figure 19, for example if k equals 3, each letter would move forward by three, and 
A will be replaced by D. B is replaced with E, and so on. The letters which sit in end of 
the alphabet will roll back to the beginning. So, W will be replaced by Z, X will be 
replaced by A. 
B. AES 
Due to the less security of DES, AES is a specification for encryption of the electronic 
data and it was published in 2001 by the National Institute of Standard and Technology 
(NIST).  It aims to develop a royalty-free cryptographic technique for public authorities 
and private department. There are no known approaches for an attack in case of AES-
128. (Biryukov & Khovratovich 2009.) 
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Table 6. AES Parameters (The AES Cipher). 
Key Size 
(words/bytes/bits) 
 
4/16/128 
 
6/24/192 
 
8/32/256 
Plaintext block 
size 
(words/bytes/bits) 
 
4/16/128 
 
4/16/128 
 
4/16/128 
Number of rounds 10 12 14 
Round key size 
(words/bytes/bits) 
 
4/16/128 
 
4/16/128 
 
4/16/128 
Expanded key size 
(words/bytes) 
 
44/176 
 
52/208 
 
60/240 
AES can be used with a variable block and key length; there are 56 bits for DES which 
will increase the computational power and are easy to break (NIST 2001). Refer to the 
Table 6, if a 128 bits key is chosen, the message M is divided into several blocks 1m ,
2m … nm . A simple bitwise XOR is applied to each byte of the block and the portion of 
the expanded key is processed in 10 rounds using following operations as well the 
Figure 20. 
Substitution: Each byte is replaced with another one according to a 256-byte look-up 
table called the S-box. 
Permutation: Cyclically shifting of lines in state array. The bytes in each of the 4 rows 
in the state are rotated by (n-1) where n represents the row number from 1 to 4. 
53 
 
Diffusion: Performing matrix multiplication, each byte of a column with every other 
byte. The state can be considered to be a 4*4 matrix and this transformation can be 
achieved by multiplying this matrix by: 












02010103
03020101
01030201
01010302
 
In the last round this step must be omitted. 
Key Generation: Performing XOR operation. In this transformation, the round key is 
simply added to the state, which is done by GF ( 82 ). 
The decryption of AES uses the inverse function of encryption and the same key-
schedule for the round keys, which need longer processing time due to high complexity. 
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Figure 20. The procedure of AES encryption and decryption.  
AES works with three key lengths, thus three different versions of the encryption and 
decryption scheme have been prepared. The key sizes used for an AES cipher specified 
the number of repetitions of transformation rounds. The numbers of repetitions of 
transformation rounds are as follows: 
 10 rounds for 128-bit key; 
 12 rounds for 192-bit key; 
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 14 rounds for 256-bit key. 
5.4. Result of the implementation 
A. CAESAR 
After programming the STK 500 with ATMEL studio, Realterm is used for the 
communication between PC and microcontroller. 
A string is sent from the Realterm application (running on the PC) to the microcontroller, 
where the string will be encrypted. The encrypted string is sent back to the Realterm 
application, after that the microcontroller decrypts the string again and sends it to the 
Realterm application. 
 
Figure 21. CAESAR algorithm encryption. 
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Plain message is ABCD and cipher message is BCDE, see Figure 21. 
The decryption is quite simple here; just reverse the key shift. The encrypted key is 1, so 
the decrypted key is -1. Figure 22 illustrates the decryption result. 
 
Figure 22. CAESAR algorithm decryption. 
B. AES 
The result of AES encryption and decryption is shown in Figure 23.The block message 
is 128 bits. AES has 10 rounds for a key length 128 bits; 12 rounds for a 192-bit key and 
14 rounds for a 256-bit key. In this experiment, the time and current consumption for the 
encryption and decryption is measured.  
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Figure 23. AES Encryption and Decryption result. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
58 
 
5.5 Time Consumption of Different Key Length 
A. CAESAR encryption and decryption 
An oscilloscope is used for measuring the times. Before and after the encryption/ 
decryption a selected pin is toggled. Then the encryption time with different number of 
bytes and different frequencies is measured. Figure 24 is the screenshot of the CAESAR 
encryption time measuring result for 50bytes and a beginning of 8 MHz on oscilloscope. 
 
Figure 24. The screenshot of CAESAR encryption time at 8 MHz and 50bytes message 
on oscilloscope. 
The result of time consumption for CAESAR encryption with different bytes and 
different frequencies is shown in Table 7. For CAESAR, decryption is just the reverse 
procedure of encryption, so the time consumption is just the same as encryption. 
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Table 7. The result of CAESAR encryption time of different times with different 
frequencies and messages bytes 
   Frequency 
 
 
NO. of bytes 
 
1MHz 
 
4MHz 
 
8MHZ 
50 12.80 ms 3.12ms 1.56ms 
100 25.40ms 6.20ms 3.12ms 
150 38.00ms 9.30ms 4.72ms 
200 50.08ms 12.30ms 6.28ms 
The relationship between the encryption time and the frequency is linear; as well it is 
linear with the plaintext bytes. The bigger the frequency, the shorter the time 
consumption is; the more the number of bytes, the higher the time consumption. Figure 
25 represents those relationships. 
Generally, decryption time is just the same as encryption in CAESAR. 
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Figure 25. The relationship among CAESAR, frequency and message bytes. 
B. AES 
In this section, the encryption and decryption times of AES are measured and compared 
by using different key lengths at different frequencies. An oscilloscope is used for 
measuring the times. Before and after the encryption/ decryption a selected pin is 
toggled. Figure 26 is the screenshot of the AES encryption time measuring result for 50 
bytes and a frequency of 8 MHz on oscilloscope. 
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Figure 26. The screenshot of the AES encryption time at 8MHz 128 bit key on 
oscilloscope. 
The result of time consumption for AES encryption with different key lengths and 
different frequencies is shown is the Table 8.  
Table 8. Results of AES Encryption time consumption on Atmel STK 500 with different 
key lengths and different frequencies. 
                              Frequency 
Key Length Rounds 1MHz 4MHz 8MHz 
128 bit 10 8.80ms 2.20ms 1.20ms 
192 bit 12 10.60ms 2.78ms 1.40ms 
256 bit 14 13.40ms 3.24ms 1.66ms 
The relationship of AES encryption time consumption with different key lengths and 
different frequencies is shown as a bar chart in Figure 27. 
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Figure 27. The bar chart of the relationship among AES encryption time consumption, 
frequency and key lengths. 
The comparison to the encryption time obtain in Table 8, the decryption time is a little 
bit longer than the encryption (see Table 9). 
Table 9. Results of the AES Decryption time consumption on Atmel STK 500 with 
different key lengths and different frequencies. 
                              Frequency 
Key Length Rounds 1MHz 4MHz 8MHz 
128 bit 10 9.60ms 2.50ms 1.24ms 
192 bit 12 11.40ms 2.90ms 1.48ms 
256 bit 14 13.60ms 3.30ms 1.72ms 
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The relationship of AES encryption time consumption with different key lengths and 
different frequencies is shown as a bar chart in Figure 28. 
 
Figure 28. The bar chart of the relationship among AES decryption time consumption, 
frequency and key lengths. 
5.6 Power Consumption of Different Frequencies 
A multimeter is used for measuring the current. Idle current is measured when the circuit 
is idle; maximum current is measured when the circuit is being operated under 
encryption and decryption process. The circuit model is illustrated in Figure 29. The 
input voltage is 12 Volts. Then the power consumption can be calculated by formula 
Power= current *voltage. 
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Figure 29. Circuit Model.  
The current consumption of CAESAR is measured, and the result is listed in Table 10. 
Table 10.  Results of CAESAR idle and max current measurement 
Frequency 1 MHz 4MHz 8MHz 
Idle Current 102.5mA 107.2mA 111.9mA 
Max Current 110mA 114.5mA 118.6mA 
The relationship of CAESAR encryption current consumption with different frequencies 
is shown as a bar chart in Figure 30. 
 
Figure 30. The bar chart shows the relationship between CAESAR encryption current 
consumption and frequency. 
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The maximum power consumption at 1MHz is calculated as: P=V*I= 12Volts * 
110mA= 1.32 Watt. Then the power/time =1.32watt / 12.8 ms= 103.125 watt/s. When 
Frequency at 4MHz, P/T = 440.38 watt/s. More power consumption results in less time 
consumption. This principle is the same for AES cryptography. 
The current consumption of AES is measured, and the result is listed in Table 11. 
Table 11. Results of AES idle and max current measurement. 
Frequency 1 MHz 4MHz 8MHz 
Idle Current 99.9 mA 103.8mA 106.7mA 
Max Current 101.7mA 106.6mA 110.3mA 
The relationship of the CAESAR encryption current consumption with different 
frequencies is shown as a bar chart in Figure 31. 
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Figure 31. The bar chart of the relationship between AES encryption current 
consumption and frequency. 
The result shows that the higher the frequency, the higher the current consumption. Here 
voltage is constant; the power consumption is increasing with the rise of the frequency. 
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6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this thesis, symmetric cryptography and asymmetric cryptography algorithms were 
analyzed and researched in the theoretical section.  Different algorithms were compared 
by the key lengths, the length of encryption time and decryption time, as well the 
security of itself. In the practical section, CAESAR and AES were coded by C language 
and programmed on an embedded system (Atmel STK 500 board). Time consumption 
and power consumption of each algorithm were measured. The higher the frequency is, 
the less the time consumption is. Bigger messages or longer key lengths lead to more 
time consumptions. Regarding to the power consumption, a higher frequency results in 
more power consumption. After analyzing those results, it is obviously shown that 
power consumption decreases when time consumption increases. 
ECC is a new secure innovation in the information security field that can be adapted in 
the future telecommunication and embedded system area. Absolute advantages in 
computing speed and storage space, it is a research hot spot in current public 
cryptography systems. As a matter of factor, there are still rooms for improvement on 
the implementation of ECC with software.  
There are still many problems in the research field of ECC, which become the bottleneck 
of its development and application, such as embedded plaintext algorithm, curve and 
basis of calculation and the selection of safety curve algorithm. The calculation of 
ECDLP is the core research of the elliptic curve. Future works on ECC are based on 
three aspects: how to select the high security level Elliptic Curve, which means the 
68 
 
selected algorithm is easy to be applied and hard to brake. In the Elliptic Curve 
Cryptosystem, the times of points on the elliptic curve group take up a large proportion 
of the whole operation. The efficiency is related to the execution of the whole procedure. 
As far as the application and development of Smart Card and wireless communication 
field are concerned, what is significant to be researched is how to enhance the defense 
capability of the chip itself.  
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APPENDIXES 
APPENDIX 1. S-box(William Stallings 2011: 181) 
 
Inverse S-box 
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APPENDIX 2. CAESAR Encryption  
################################################################ 
### 
### CAESAR encryption code 
### 
### Copyright (C) 2013, Qian Yang (t94781@student.uwasa.fi) 
### 
### University of Vaasa 
### 
################################################################ 
#include <stdio.h> 
#include <stdlib.h> 
#include <string.h> 
#include <avr/interrupt.h> 
#define ARRAY_SIZE 220 
static volatile uint8_t count; 
static char buffer[ARRAY_SIZE];  
void caesar(char *, const int); 
// ISR for USART receive 
ISR(USART_RX_vect) 
{ 
 buffer[count] = UDR; 
 if(buffer[count] == '\r' || count == (ARRAY_SIZE -1)) 
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 { 
  buffer[count] == '\0'; 
  // set PB0 to 1 
  PORTB |= (1 << PB0); 
     
  caesar(buffer, 10); 
  // set PB0 to 0 
  PORTB &= ~(1 << PB0); 
  int i; 
  for(i = 0; i < count; i++) 
  { 
   usart_putc(buffer[i]); 
   buffer[i] = '\0'; 
  }   
  count = 0;   
 } 
 else  
  count++;  
} 
int main(void) 
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{ 
 // define PB0 of PORTB as output 
 DDRB |= (1 << PB0); 
 // set PB0 to 0 
 PORTB &= ~(1 << PB0); 
 // initialize USART 
 //UBRRL = 103; // 8MHz Baudrate 9600 
 //UBRRL = 51; // 4MHz Baudrate 9600 
 UBRRL = 12; // 1MHz Baudrate 9600 
 UCSRA |= (1 << U2X); 
 UCSRB |= (1 << RXCIE) | (1 << RXEN) | (1 << TXEN); 
 // initialize count variable 
 count = 0; 
 // enable interrupt 
 sei(); 
 while(1); 
 return 0; 
} 
inline void caesar(char *str, const int offset) 
{  
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 for(;*str!='\0';str++) 
 { 
  if(*str>='A' && *str<='Z') 
  *str = 'A' + (*str - 'A' + offset) % 26; 
  else if(*str>='a' && *str<='z') 
  *str = 'a' + (*str - 'a' + offset) % 26;   
 }  
} 
void usart_putc(unsigned char c) 
{ 
 // wait for an empty transmit buffer 
 // UDRE = USART Data Register Empty 
 // if UDRE = 1 the buffer is empty 
 while(!(UCSRA & (1 << UDRE))); 
 // USART I/O Data Register 
 UDR = c; 
} 
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APPENDIX 3.  AES Encryption and Decryption 
################################################################ 
### AES Encryption and Decryption code 
### 
### Original author: Karl Malbrain, malbrain@yahoo.com 
### Modified and ported to Atmel AVR by: Yang Qian 
### (t94781@student.uwasa.fi) 
### University of Vaasa 
################################################################ 
// AES only supports Nb=4 
#define Nb 4    
// The number of columns comprising a state in AES. This is a constant in AES. 
Value=4 
#define Nk 4   // number of columns in a key 
#define Nr 10   // number of rounds in encryption 
 
#define Sbox(i) (pgm_read_byte(&P_Sbox[i])) 
const unsigned char P_Sbox[256] __attribute__ ((__progmem__)) = {   
// forward s-box 
0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 
0xab, 0x76, 
0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0, 0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 
0x72, 0xc0, 
0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc, 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 
0x31, 0x15, 
0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a, 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 
0xb2, 0x75, 
0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0, 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 
0x2f, 0x84, 
0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b, 0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 
0x58, 0xcf, 
0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85, 0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 
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0x9f, 0xa8, 
0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5, 0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 
0xf3, 0xd2, 
0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 
0x19, 0x73, 
0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88, 0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 
0x0b, 0xdb, 
0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c, 0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 
0xe4, 0x79, 
0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9, 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 
0xae, 0x08, 
0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6, 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 
0x8b, 0x8a, 
0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e, 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 
0x1d, 0x9e, 
0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94, 0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 
0x28, 0xdf, 
0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 
0xbb, 0x16}; 
 
#define InvSbox(i) (pgm_read_byte(&P_InvSbox[i])) 
const unsigned char P_InvSbox[256] __attribute__ ((__progmem__)) = { // inverse s-
box 
0x52, 0x09, 0x6a, 0xd5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xa5, 0x38, 0xbf, 0x40, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x81, 0xf3, 
0xd7, 0xfb, 
0x7c, 0xe3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9b, 0x2f, 0xff, 0x87, 0x34, 0x8e, 0x43, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xde, 
0xe9, 0xcb, 
0x54, 0x7b, 0x94, 0x32, 0xa6, 0xc2, 0x23, 0x3d, 0xee, 0x4c, 0x95, 0x0b, 0x42, 0xfa, 
0xc3, 0x4e, 
0x08, 0x2e, 0xa1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xd9, 0x24, 0xb2, 0x76, 0x5b, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x6d, 0x8b, 
0xd1, 0x25, 
0x72, 0xf8, 0xf6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16, 0xd4, 0xa4, 0x5c, 0xcc, 0x5d, 0x65, 
0xb6, 0x92, 
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0x6c, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xfd, 0xed, 0xb9, 0xda, 0x5e, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xa7, 0x8d, 
0x9d, 0x84, 
0x90, 0xd8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x8c, 0xbc, 0xd3, 0x0a, 0xf7, 0xe4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xb8, 0xb3, 
0x45, 0x06, 
0xd0, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0xca, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0x02, 0xc1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 
0x8a, 0x6b, 
0x3a, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4f, 0x67, 0xdc, 0xea, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0xce, 0xf0, 0xb4, 
0xe6, 0x73, 
0x96, 0xac, 0x74, 0x22, 0xe7, 0xad, 0x35, 0x85, 0xe2, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xe8, 0x1c, 0x75, 
0xdf, 0x6e, 
0x47, 0xf1, 0x1a, 0x71, 0x1d, 0x29, 0xc5, 0x89, 0x6f, 0xb7, 0x62, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x18, 
0xbe, 0x1b, 
0xfc, 0x56, 0x3e, 0x4b, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x79, 0x20, 0x9a, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x78, 0xcd, 
0x5a, 0xf4, 
0x1f, 0xdd, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xc7, 0x31, 0xb1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 
0xec, 0x5f, 
0x60, 0x51, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x19, 0xb5, 0x4a, 0x0d, 0x2d, 0xe5, 0x7a, 0x9f, 0x93, 0xc9, 
0x9c, 0xef, 
0xa0, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x2a, 0xf5, 0xb0, 0xc8, 0xeb, 0xbb, 0x3c, 0x83, 0x53, 
0x99, 0x61, 
0x17, 0x2b, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xba, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x26, 0xe1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 
0x0c, 0x7d}; 
 
// combined Xtimes2[Sbox[]] 
#define Xtime2Sbox(i) (pgm_read_byte(&P_Xtime2Sbox[i])) 
const unsigned char P_Xtime2Sbox[256] __attribute__ ((__progmem__)) = { 
0xc6, 0xf8, 0xee, 0xf6, 0xff, 0xd6, 0xde, 0x91, 0x60, 0x02, 0xce, 0x56, 0xe7, 0xb5, 
0x4d, 0xec,  
0x8f, 0x1f, 0x89, 0xfa, 0xef, 0xb2, 0x8e, 0xfb, 0x41, 0xb3, 0x5f, 0x45, 0x23, 0x53, 
0xe4, 0x9b,  
0x75, 0xe1, 0x3d, 0x4c, 0x6c, 0x7e, 0xf5, 0x83, 0x68, 0x51, 0xd1, 0xf9, 0xe2, 0xab, 
0x62, 0x2a,  
0x08, 0x95, 0x46, 0x9d, 0x30, 0x37, 0x0a, 0x2f, 0x0e, 0x24, 0x1b, 0xdf, 0xcd, 0x4e, 
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0x7f, 0xea,  
0x12, 0x1d, 0x58, 0x34, 0x36, 0xdc, 0xb4, 0x5b, 0xa4, 0x76, 0xb7, 0x7d, 0x52, 0xdd, 
0x5e, 0x13,  
0xa6, 0xb9, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x40, 0xe3, 0x79, 0xb6, 0xd4, 0x8d, 0x67, 0x72, 0x94, 0x98, 
0xb0, 0x85,  
0xbb, 0xc5, 0x4f, 0xed, 0x86, 0x9a, 0x66, 0x11, 0x8a, 0xe9, 0x04, 0xfe, 0xa0, 0x78, 
0x25, 0x4b,  
0xa2, 0x5d, 0x80, 0x05, 0x3f, 0x21, 0x70, 0xf1, 0x63, 0x77, 0xaf, 0x42, 0x20, 0xe5, 
0xfd, 0xbf,  
0x81, 0x18, 0x26, 0xc3, 0xbe, 0x35, 0x88, 0x2e, 0x93, 0x55, 0xfc, 0x7a, 0xc8, 0xba, 
0x32, 0xe6,  
0xc0, 0x19, 0x9e, 0xa3, 0x44, 0x54, 0x3b, 0x0b, 0x8c, 0xc7, 0x6b, 0x28, 0xa7, 0xbc, 
0x16, 0xad,  
0xdb, 0x64, 0x74, 0x14, 0x92, 0x0c, 0x48, 0xb8, 0x9f, 0xbd, 0x43, 0xc4, 0x39, 0x31, 
0xd3, 0xf2,  
0xd5, 0x8b, 0x6e, 0xda, 0x01, 0xb1, 0x9c, 0x49, 0xd8, 0xac, 0xf3, 0xcf, 0xca, 0xf4, 
0x47, 0x10,  
0x6f, 0xf0, 0x4a, 0x5c, 0x38, 0x57, 0x73, 0x97, 0xcb, 0xa1, 0xe8, 0x3e, 0x96, 0x61, 
0x0d, 0x0f,  
0xe0, 0x7c, 0x71, 0xcc, 0x90, 0x06, 0xf7, 0x1c, 0xc2, 0x6a, 0xae, 0x69, 0x17, 0x99, 
0x3a, 0x27,  
0xd9, 0xeb, 0x2b, 0x22, 0xd2, 0xa9, 0x07, 0x33, 0x2d, 0x3c, 0x15, 0xc9, 0x87, 0xaa, 
0x50, 0xa5,  
0x03, 0x59, 0x09, 0x1a, 0x65, 0xd7, 0x84, 0xd0, 0x82, 0x29, 0x5a, 0x1e, 0x7b, 0xa8, 
0x6d, 0x2c  
}; 
 
// combined Xtimes3[Sbox[]] 
#define Xtime3Sbox(i) (pgm_read_byte(&P_Xtime3Sbox[i])) 
const unsigned char P_Xtime3Sbox[256] __attribute__ ((__progmem__)) = { 
0xa5, 0x84, 0x99, 0x8d, 0x0d, 0xbd, 0xb1, 0x54, 0x50, 0x03, 0xa9, 0x7d, 0x19, 0x62, 
0xe6, 0x9a,  
0x45, 0x9d, 0x40, 0x87, 0x15, 0xeb, 0xc9, 0x0b, 0xec, 0x67, 0xfd, 0xea, 0xbf, 0xf7, 
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0x96, 0x5b,  
0xc2, 0x1c, 0xae, 0x6a, 0x5a, 0x41, 0x02, 0x4f, 0x5c, 0xf4, 0x34, 0x08, 0x93, 0x73, 
0x53, 0x3f,  
0x0c, 0x52, 0x65, 0x5e, 0x28, 0xa1, 0x0f, 0xb5, 0x09, 0x36, 0x9b, 0x3d, 0x26, 0x69, 
0xcd, 0x9f,  
0x1b, 0x9e, 0x74, 0x2e, 0x2d, 0xb2, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xf6, 0x4d, 0x61, 0xce, 0x7b, 0x3e, 
0x71, 0x97,  
0xf5, 0x68, 0x00, 0x2c, 0x60, 0x1f, 0xc8, 0xed, 0xbe, 0x46, 0xd9, 0x4b, 0xde, 0xd4, 
0xe8, 0x4a,  
0x6b, 0x2a, 0xe5, 0x16, 0xc5, 0xd7, 0x55, 0x94, 0xcf, 0x10, 0x06, 0x81, 0xf0, 0x44, 
0xba, 0xe3,  
0xf3, 0xfe, 0xc0, 0x8a, 0xad, 0xbc, 0x48, 0x04, 0xdf, 0xc1, 0x75, 0x63, 0x30, 0x1a, 
0x0e, 0x6d,  
0x4c, 0x14, 0x35, 0x2f, 0xe1, 0xa2, 0xcc, 0x39, 0x57, 0xf2, 0x82, 0x47, 0xac, 0xe7, 
0x2b, 0x95,  
0xa0, 0x98, 0xd1, 0x7f, 0x66, 0x7e, 0xab, 0x83, 0xca, 0x29, 0xd3, 0x3c, 0x79, 0xe2, 
0x1d, 0x76,  
0x3b, 0x56, 0x4e, 0x1e, 0xdb, 0x0a, 0x6c, 0xe4, 0x5d, 0x6e, 0xef, 0xa6, 0xa8, 0xa4, 
0x37, 0x8b,  
0x32, 0x43, 0x59, 0xb7, 0x8c, 0x64, 0xd2, 0xe0, 0xb4, 0xfa, 0x07, 0x25, 0xaf, 0x8e, 
0xe9, 0x18,  
0xd5, 0x88, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x24, 0xf1, 0xc7, 0x51, 0x23, 0x7c, 0x9c, 0x21, 0xdd, 0xdc, 
0x86, 0x85,  
0x90, 0x42, 0xc4, 0xaa, 0xd8, 0x05, 0x01, 0x12, 0xa3, 0x5f, 0xf9, 0xd0, 0x91, 0x58, 
0x27, 0xb9,  
0x38, 0x13, 0xb3, 0x33, 0xbb, 0x70, 0x89, 0xa7, 0xb6, 0x22, 0x92, 0x20, 0x49, 0xff, 
0x78, 0x7a,  
0x8f, 0xf8, 0x80, 0x17, 0xda, 0x31, 0xc6, 0xb8, 0xc3, 0xb0, 0x77, 0x11, 0xcb, 0xfc, 
0xd6, 0x3a  
}; 
 
// modular multiplication tables 
// based on: 
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// Xtime2[x] = (x & 0x80 ? 0x1b : 0) ^ (x + x) 
// Xtime3[x] = x^Xtime2[x]; 
 
#define Xtime2(i) (pgm_read_byte(&P_Xtime2[i])) 
const unsigned char P_Xtime2[256] __attribute__ ((__progmem__)) = { 
0x00, 0x02, 0x04, 0x06, 0x08, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x0e, 0x10, 0x12, 0x14, 0x16, 0x18, 0x1a, 
0x1c, 0x1e,  
0x20, 0x22, 0x24, 0x26, 0x28, 0x2a, 0x2c, 0x2e, 0x30, 0x32, 0x34, 0x36, 0x38, 0x3a, 
0x3c, 0x3e,  
0x40, 0x42, 0x44, 0x46, 0x48, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x4e, 0x50, 0x52, 0x54, 0x56, 0x58, 0x5a, 
0x5c, 0x5e,  
0x60, 0x62, 0x64, 0x66, 0x68, 0x6a, 0x6c, 0x6e, 0x70, 0x72, 0x74, 0x76, 0x78, 0x7a, 
0x7c, 0x7e,  
0x80, 0x82, 0x84, 0x86, 0x88, 0x8a, 0x8c, 0x8e, 0x90, 0x92, 0x94, 0x96, 0x98, 0x9a, 
0x9c, 0x9e,  
0xa0, 0xa2, 0xa4, 0xa6, 0xa8, 0xaa, 0xac, 0xae, 0xb0, 0xb2, 0xb4, 0xb6, 0xb8, 0xba, 
0xbc, 0xbe,  
0xc0, 0xc2, 0xc4, 0xc6, 0xc8, 0xca, 0xcc, 0xce, 0xd0, 0xd2, 0xd4, 0xd6, 0xd8, 0xda, 
0xdc, 0xde,  
0xe0, 0xe2, 0xe4, 0xe6, 0xe8, 0xea, 0xec, 0xee, 0xf0, 0xf2, 0xf4, 0xf6, 0xf8, 0xfa, 0xfc, 
0xfe,  
0x1b, 0x19, 0x1f, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x11, 0x17, 0x15, 0x0b, 0x09, 0x0f, 0x0d, 0x03, 0x01, 
0x07, 0x05,  
0x3b, 0x39, 0x3f, 0x3d, 0x33, 0x31, 0x37, 0x35, 0x2b, 0x29, 0x2f, 0x2d, 0x23, 0x21, 
0x27, 0x25,  
0x5b, 0x59, 0x5f, 0x5d, 0x53, 0x51, 0x57, 0x55, 0x4b, 0x49, 0x4f, 0x4d, 0x43, 0x41, 
0x47, 0x45,  
0x7b, 0x79, 0x7f, 0x7d, 0x73, 0x71, 0x77, 0x75, 0x6b, 0x69, 0x6f, 0x6d, 0x63, 0x61, 
0x67, 0x65,  
0x9b, 0x99, 0x9f, 0x9d, 0x93, 0x91, 0x97, 0x95, 0x8b, 0x89, 0x8f, 0x8d, 0x83, 0x81, 
0x87, 0x85,  
0xbb, 0xb9, 0xbf, 0xbd, 0xb3, 0xb1, 0xb7, 0xb5, 0xab, 0xa9, 0xaf, 0xad, 0xa3, 0xa1, 
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0xa7, 0xa5,  
0xdb, 0xd9, 0xdf, 0xdd, 0xd3, 0xd1, 0xd7, 0xd5, 0xcb, 0xc9, 0xcf, 0xcd, 0xc3, 0xc1, 
0xc7, 0xc5,  
0xfb, 0xf9, 0xff, 0xfd, 0xf3, 0xf1, 0xf7, 0xf5, 0xeb, 0xe9, 0xef, 0xed, 0xe3, 0xe1, 0xe7, 
0xe5};  
 
#define Xtime9(i) (pgm_read_byte(&P_Xtime9[i])) 
const unsigned char P_Xtime9[256] __attribute__ ((__progmem__)) = { 
0x00, 0x09, 0x12, 0x1b, 0x24, 0x2d, 0x36, 0x3f, 0x48, 0x41, 0x5a, 0x53, 0x6c, 0x65, 
0x7e, 0x77,  
0x90, 0x99, 0x82, 0x8b, 0xb4, 0xbd, 0xa6, 0xaf, 0xd8, 0xd1, 0xca, 0xc3, 0xfc, 0xf5, 
0xee, 0xe7,  
0x3b, 0x32, 0x29, 0x20, 0x1f, 0x16, 0x0d, 0x04, 0x73, 0x7a, 0x61, 0x68, 0x57, 0x5e, 
0x45, 0x4c,  
0xab, 0xa2, 0xb9, 0xb0, 0x8f, 0x86, 0x9d, 0x94, 0xe3, 0xea, 0xf1, 0xf8, 0xc7, 0xce, 
0xd5, 0xdc,  
0x76, 0x7f, 0x64, 0x6d, 0x52, 0x5b, 0x40, 0x49, 0x3e, 0x37, 0x2c, 0x25, 0x1a, 0x13, 
0x08, 0x01,  
0xe6, 0xef, 0xf4, 0xfd, 0xc2, 0xcb, 0xd0, 0xd9, 0xae, 0xa7, 0xbc, 0xb5, 0x8a, 0x83, 
0x98, 0x91,  
0x4d, 0x44, 0x5f, 0x56, 0x69, 0x60, 0x7b, 0x72, 0x05, 0x0c, 0x17, 0x1e, 0x21, 0x28, 
0x33, 0x3a,  
0xdd, 0xd4, 0xcf, 0xc6, 0xf9, 0xf0, 0xeb, 0xe2, 0x95, 0x9c, 0x87, 0x8e, 0xb1, 0xb8, 
0xa3, 0xaa,  
0xec, 0xe5, 0xfe, 0xf7, 0xc8, 0xc1, 0xda, 0xd3, 0xa4, 0xad, 0xb6, 0xbf, 0x80, 0x89, 
0x92, 0x9b,  
0x7c, 0x75, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x58, 0x51, 0x4a, 0x43, 0x34, 0x3d, 0x26, 0x2f, 0x10, 0x19, 
0x02, 0x0b,  
0xd7, 0xde, 0xc5, 0xcc, 0xf3, 0xfa, 0xe1, 0xe8, 0x9f, 0x96, 0x8d, 0x84, 0xbb, 0xb2, 
0xa9, 0xa0,  
0x47, 0x4e, 0x55, 0x5c, 0x63, 0x6a, 0x71, 0x78, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x1d, 0x14, 0x2b, 0x22, 
0x39, 0x30,  
0x9a, 0x93, 0x88, 0x81, 0xbe, 0xb7, 0xac, 0xa5, 0xd2, 0xdb, 0xc0, 0xc9, 0xf6, 0xff, 
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0xe4, 0xed,  
0x0a, 0x03, 0x18, 0x11, 0x2e, 0x27, 0x3c, 0x35, 0x42, 0x4b, 0x50, 0x59, 0x66, 0x6f, 
0x74, 0x7d,  
0xa1, 0xa8, 0xb3, 0xba, 0x85, 0x8c, 0x97, 0x9e, 0xe9, 0xe0, 0xfb, 0xf2, 0xcd, 0xc4, 
0xdf, 0xd6,  
0x31, 0x38, 0x23, 0x2a, 0x15, 0x1c, 0x07, 0x0e, 0x79, 0x70, 0x6b, 0x62, 0x5d, 0x54, 
0x4f, 0x46}; 
 
#define XtimeB(i) (pgm_read_byte(&P_XtimeB[i])) 
const unsigned char P_XtimeB[256] __attribute__ ((__progmem__)) = { 
0x00, 0x0b, 0x16, 0x1d, 0x2c, 0x27, 0x3a, 0x31, 0x58, 0x53, 0x4e, 0x45, 0x74, 0x7f, 
0x62, 0x69,  
0xb0, 0xbb, 0xa6, 0xad, 0x9c, 0x97, 0x8a, 0x81, 0xe8, 0xe3, 0xfe, 0xf5, 0xc4, 0xcf, 
0xd2, 0xd9,  
0x7b, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x66, 0x57, 0x5c, 0x41, 0x4a, 0x23, 0x28, 0x35, 0x3e, 0x0f, 0x04, 
0x19, 0x12,  
0xcb, 0xc0, 0xdd, 0xd6, 0xe7, 0xec, 0xf1, 0xfa, 0x93, 0x98, 0x85, 0x8e, 0xbf, 0xb4, 
0xa9, 0xa2,  
0xf6, 0xfd, 0xe0, 0xeb, 0xda, 0xd1, 0xcc, 0xc7, 0xae, 0xa5, 0xb8, 0xb3, 0x82, 0x89, 
0x94, 0x9f,  
0x46, 0x4d, 0x50, 0x5b, 0x6a, 0x61, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x1e, 0x15, 0x08, 0x03, 0x32, 0x39, 
0x24, 0x2f,  
0x8d, 0x86, 0x9b, 0x90, 0xa1, 0xaa, 0xb7, 0xbc, 0xd5, 0xde, 0xc3, 0xc8, 0xf9, 0xf2, 
0xef, 0xe4,  
0x3d, 0x36, 0x2b, 0x20, 0x11, 0x1a, 0x07, 0x0c, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x73, 0x78, 0x49, 0x42, 
0x5f, 0x54,  
0xf7, 0xfc, 0xe1, 0xea, 0xdb, 0xd0, 0xcd, 0xc6, 0xaf, 0xa4, 0xb9, 0xb2, 0x83, 0x88, 
0x95, 0x9e,  
0x47, 0x4c, 0x51, 0x5a, 0x6b, 0x60, 0x7d, 0x76, 0x1f, 0x14, 0x09, 0x02, 0x33, 0x38, 
0x25, 0x2e,  
0x8c, 0x87, 0x9a, 0x91, 0xa0, 0xab, 0xb6, 0xbd, 0xd4, 0xdf, 0xc2, 0xc9, 0xf8, 0xf3, 
0xee, 0xe5,  
0x3c, 0x37, 0x2a, 0x21, 0x10, 0x1b, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x64, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x79, 0x48, 0x43, 
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0x5e, 0x55,  
0x01, 0x0a, 0x17, 0x1c, 0x2d, 0x26, 0x3b, 0x30, 0x59, 0x52, 0x4f, 0x44, 0x75, 0x7e, 
0x63, 0x68,  
0xb1, 0xba, 0xa7, 0xac, 0x9d, 0x96, 0x8b, 0x80, 0xe9, 0xe2, 0xff, 0xf4, 0xc5, 0xce, 
0xd3, 0xd8,  
0x7a, 0x71, 0x6c, 0x67, 0x56, 0x5d, 0x40, 0x4b, 0x22, 0x29, 0x34, 0x3f, 0x0e, 0x05, 
0x18, 0x13,  
0xca, 0xc1, 0xdc, 0xd7, 0xe6, 0xed, 0xf0, 0xfb, 0x92, 0x99, 0x84, 0x8f, 0xbe, 0xb5, 
0xa8, 0xa3};  
 
#define XtimeD(i) (pgm_read_byte(&P_XtimeD[i])) 
const unsigned char P_XtimeD[256] __attribute__ ((__progmem__)) = { 
0x00, 0x0d, 0x1a, 0x17, 0x34, 0x39, 0x2e, 0x23, 0x68, 0x65, 0x72, 0x7f, 0x5c, 0x51, 
0x46, 0x4b,  
0xd0, 0xdd, 0xca, 0xc7, 0xe4, 0xe9, 0xfe, 0xf3, 0xb8, 0xb5, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x8c, 0x81, 
0x96, 0x9b,  
0xbb, 0xb6, 0xa1, 0xac, 0x8f, 0x82, 0x95, 0x98, 0xd3, 0xde, 0xc9, 0xc4, 0xe7, 0xea, 
0xfd, 0xf0,  
0x6b, 0x66, 0x71, 0x7c, 0x5f, 0x52, 0x45, 0x48, 0x03, 0x0e, 0x19, 0x14, 0x37, 0x3a, 
0x2d, 0x20,  
0x6d, 0x60, 0x77, 0x7a, 0x59, 0x54, 0x43, 0x4e, 0x05, 0x08, 0x1f, 0x12, 0x31, 0x3c, 
0x2b, 0x26,  
0xbd, 0xb0, 0xa7, 0xaa, 0x89, 0x84, 0x93, 0x9e, 0xd5, 0xd8, 0xcf, 0xc2, 0xe1, 0xec, 
0xfb, 0xf6,  
0xd6, 0xdb, 0xcc, 0xc1, 0xe2, 0xef, 0xf8, 0xf5, 0xbe, 0xb3, 0xa4, 0xa9, 0x8a, 0x87, 
0x90, 0x9d,  
0x06, 0x0b, 0x1c, 0x11, 0x32, 0x3f, 0x28, 0x25, 0x6e, 0x63, 0x74, 0x79, 0x5a, 0x57, 
0x40, 0x4d,  
0xda, 0xd7, 0xc0, 0xcd, 0xee, 0xe3, 0xf4, 0xf9, 0xb2, 0xbf, 0xa8, 0xa5, 0x86, 0x8b, 
0x9c, 0x91,  
0x0a, 0x07, 0x10, 0x1d, 0x3e, 0x33, 0x24, 0x29, 0x62, 0x6f, 0x78, 0x75, 0x56, 0x5b, 
0x4c, 0x41,  
0x61, 0x6c, 0x7b, 0x76, 0x55, 0x58, 0x4f, 0x42, 0x09, 0x04, 0x13, 0x1e, 0x3d, 0x30, 
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0x27, 0x2a,  
0xb1, 0xbc, 0xab, 0xa6, 0x85, 0x88, 0x9f, 0x92, 0xd9, 0xd4, 0xc3, 0xce, 0xed, 0xe0, 
0xf7, 0xfa,  
0xb7, 0xba, 0xad, 0xa0, 0x83, 0x8e, 0x99, 0x94, 0xdf, 0xd2, 0xc5, 0xc8, 0xeb, 0xe6, 
0xf1, 0xfc,  
0x67, 0x6a, 0x7d, 0x70, 0x53, 0x5e, 0x49, 0x44, 0x0f, 0x02, 0x15, 0x18, 0x3b, 0x36, 
0x21, 0x2c,  
0x0c, 0x01, 0x16, 0x1b, 0x38, 0x35, 0x22, 0x2f, 0x64, 0x69, 0x7e, 0x73, 0x50, 0x5d, 
0x4a, 0x47,  
0xdc, 0xd1, 0xc6, 0xcb, 0xe8, 0xe5, 0xf2, 0xff, 0xb4, 0xb9, 0xae, 0xa3, 0x80, 0x8d, 
0x9a, 0x97};  
 
#define XtimeE(i) (pgm_read_byte(&P_XtimeE[i])) 
const unsigned char P_XtimeE[256] __attribute__ ((__progmem__)) = { 
0x00, 0x0e, 0x1c, 0x12, 0x38, 0x36, 0x24, 0x2a, 0x70, 0x7e, 0x6c, 0x62, 0x48, 0x46, 
0x54, 0x5a,  
0xe0, 0xee, 0xfc, 0xf2, 0xd8, 0xd6, 0xc4, 0xca, 0x90, 0x9e, 0x8c, 0x82, 0xa8, 0xa6, 
0xb4, 0xba,  
0xdb, 0xd5, 0xc7, 0xc9, 0xe3, 0xed, 0xff, 0xf1, 0xab, 0xa5, 0xb7, 0xb9, 0x93, 0x9d, 
0x8f, 0x81,  
0x3b, 0x35, 0x27, 0x29, 0x03, 0x0d, 0x1f, 0x11, 0x4b, 0x45, 0x57, 0x59, 0x73, 0x7d, 
0x6f, 0x61,  
0xad, 0xa3, 0xb1, 0xbf, 0x95, 0x9b, 0x89, 0x87, 0xdd, 0xd3, 0xc1, 0xcf, 0xe5, 0xeb, 
0xf9, 0xf7,  
0x4d, 0x43, 0x51, 0x5f, 0x75, 0x7b, 0x69, 0x67, 0x3d, 0x33, 0x21, 0x2f, 0x05, 0x0b, 
0x19, 0x17,  
0x76, 0x78, 0x6a, 0x64, 0x4e, 0x40, 0x52, 0x5c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x1a, 0x14, 0x3e, 0x30, 
0x22, 0x2c,  
0x96, 0x98, 0x8a, 0x84, 0xae, 0xa0, 0xb2, 0xbc, 0xe6, 0xe8, 0xfa, 0xf4, 0xde, 0xd0, 
0xc2, 0xcc,  
0x41, 0x4f, 0x5d, 0x53, 0x79, 0x77, 0x65, 0x6b, 0x31, 0x3f, 0x2d, 0x23, 0x09, 0x07, 
0x15, 0x1b,  
0xa1, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0xb3, 0x99, 0x97, 0x85, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0xdf, 0xcd, 0xc3, 0xe9, 0xe7, 
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0xf5, 0xfb,  
0x9a, 0x94, 0x86, 0x88, 0xa2, 0xac, 0xbe, 0xb0, 0xea, 0xe4, 0xf6, 0xf8, 0xd2, 0xdc, 
0xce, 0xc0,  
0x7a, 0x74, 0x66, 0x68, 0x42, 0x4c, 0x5e, 0x50, 0x0a, 0x04, 0x16, 0x18, 0x32, 0x3c, 
0x2e, 0x20,  
0xec, 0xe2, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0xd4, 0xda, 0xc8, 0xc6, 0x9c, 0x92, 0x80, 0x8e, 0xa4, 0xaa, 
0xb8, 0xb6,  
0x0c, 0x02, 0x10, 0x1e, 0x34, 0x3a, 0x28, 0x26, 0x7c, 0x72, 0x60, 0x6e, 0x44, 0x4a, 
0x58, 0x56,  
0x37, 0x39, 0x2b, 0x25, 0x0f, 0x01, 0x13, 0x1d, 0x47, 0x49, 0x5b, 0x55, 0x7f, 0x71, 
0x63, 0x6d,  
0xd7, 0xd9, 0xcb, 0xc5, 0xef, 0xe1, 0xf3, 0xfd, 0xa7, 0xa9, 0xbb, 0xb5, 0x9f, 0x91, 
0x83, 0x8d};  
 
// exchanges columns in each of 4 rows 
// row0 - unchanged, row1- shifted left 1,  
// row2 - shifted left 2 and row3 - shifted left 3 
void ShiftRows (unsigned char *state) 
{ 
 unsigned char tmp; 
 
 // just substitute row 0 
 state[0] = Sbox(state[0]), state[4] = Sbox(state[4]); 
 state[8] = Sbox(state[8]), state[12] = Sbox(state[12]); 
 
 // rotate row 1 
 tmp = Sbox(state[1]), state[1] = Sbox(state[5]); 
 state[5] = Sbox(state[9]), state[9] = Sbox(state[13]), state[13] = tmp; 
 
 // rotate row 2 
 tmp = Sbox(state[2]), state[2] = Sbox(state[10]), state[10] = tmp; 
 tmp = Sbox(state[6]), state[6] = Sbox(state[14]), state[14] = tmp; 
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 // rotate row 3 
 tmp = Sbox(state[15]), state[15] = Sbox(state[11]); 
 state[11] = Sbox(state[7]), state[7] = Sbox(state[3]), state[3] = tmp; 
} 
 
// restores columns in each of 4 rows 
// row0 - unchanged, row1- shifted right 1,  
// row2 - shifted right 2 and row3 - shifted right 3 
void InvShiftRows (unsigned char *state) 
{ 
 unsigned char tmp; 
 
 // restore row 0 
 state[0] = InvSbox(state[0]), state[4] = InvSbox(state[4]); 
 state[8] = InvSbox(state[8]), state[12] = InvSbox(state[12]); 
 
 // restore row 1 
 tmp = InvSbox(state[13]), state[13] = InvSbox(state[9]); 
 state[9] = InvSbox(state[5]), state[5] = InvSbox(state[1]), state[1] = tmp; 
 
 // restore row 2 
 tmp = InvSbox(state[2]), state[2] = InvSbox(state[10]), state[10] = tmp; 
 tmp = InvSbox(state[6]), state[6] = InvSbox(state[14]), state[14] = tmp; 
 
 // restore row 3 
 tmp = InvSbox(state[3]), state[3] = InvSbox(state[7]); 
 state[7] = InvSbox(state[11]), state[11] = InvSbox(state[15]), state[15] = tmp; 
} 
 
// recombine and mix each row in a column 
void MixSubColumns (unsigned char *state) 
{ 
unsigned char tmp[4 * Nb]; 
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 // mixing column 0 
 tmp[0] = Xtime2Sbox(state[0]) ^ Xtime3Sbox(state[5]) ^ Sbox(state[10]) ^ 
Sbox(state[15]); 
 tmp[1] = Sbox(state[0]) ^ Xtime2Sbox(state[5]) ^ Xtime3Sbox(state[10]) ^ 
Sbox(state[15]); 
 tmp[2] = Sbox(state[0]) ^ Sbox(state[5]) ^ Xtime2Sbox(state[10]) ^ 
Xtime3Sbox(state[15]); 
 tmp[3] = Xtime3Sbox(state[0]) ^ Sbox(state[5]) ^ Sbox(state[10]) ^ 
Xtime2Sbox(state[15]); 
 
 // mixing column 1 
 tmp[4] = Xtime2Sbox(state[4]) ^ Xtime3Sbox(state[9]) ^ Sbox(state[14]) ^ 
Sbox(state[3]); 
 tmp[5] = Sbox(state[4]) ^ Xtime2Sbox(state[9]) ^ Xtime3Sbox(state[14]) ^ 
Sbox(state[3]); 
 tmp[6] = Sbox(state[4]) ^ Sbox(state[9]) ^ Xtime2Sbox(state[14]) ^ 
Xtime3Sbox(state[3]); 
 tmp[7] = Xtime3Sbox(state[4]) ^ Sbox(state[9]) ^ Sbox(state[14]) ^ 
Xtime2Sbox(state[3]); 
 
 // mixing column 2 
 tmp[8] = Xtime2Sbox(state[8]) ^ Xtime3Sbox(state[13]) ^ Sbox(state[2]) ^ 
Sbox(state[7]); 
 tmp[9] = Sbox(state[8]) ^ Xtime2Sbox(state[13]) ^ Xtime3Sbox(state[2]) ^ 
Sbox(state[7]); 
 tmp[10]  = Sbox(state[8]) ^ Sbox(state[13]) ^ Xtime2Sbox(state[2]) ^ 
Xtime3Sbox(state[7]); 
 tmp[11]  = Xtime3Sbox(state[8]) ^ Sbox(state[13]) ^ Sbox(state[2]) ^ 
Xtime2Sbox(state[7]); 
 
 // mixing column 3 
 tmp[12] = Xtime2Sbox(state[12]) ^ Xtime3Sbox(state[1]) ^ Sbox(state[6]) ^ 
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Sbox(state[11]); 
 tmp[13] = Sbox(state[12]) ^ Xtime2Sbox(state[1]) ^ Xtime3Sbox(state[6]) ^ 
Sbox(state[11]); 
 tmp[14] = Sbox(state[12]) ^ Sbox(state[1]) ^ Xtime2Sbox(state[6]) ^ 
Xtime3Sbox(state[11]); 
 tmp[15] = Xtime3Sbox(state[12]) ^ Sbox(state[1]) ^ Sbox(state[6]) ^ 
Xtime2Sbox(state[11]); 
 
 memcpy (state, tmp, sizeof(tmp)); 
} 
 
// restore and un-mix each row in a column 
void InvMixSubColumns (unsigned char *state) 
{ 
unsigned char tmp[4 * Nb]; 
int i; 
 
 // restore column 0 
 tmp[0] = XtimeE(state[0]) ^ XtimeB(state[1]) ^ XtimeD(state[2]) ^ 
Xtime9(state[3]); 
 tmp[5] = Xtime9(state[0]) ^ XtimeE(state[1]) ^ XtimeB(state[2]) ^ 
XtimeD(state[3]); 
 tmp[10] = XtimeD(state[0]) ^ Xtime9(state[1]) ^ XtimeE(state[2]) ^ 
XtimeB(state[3]); 
 tmp[15] = XtimeB(state[0]) ^ XtimeD(state[1]) ^ Xtime9(state[2]) ^ 
XtimeE(state[3]); 
 
 // restore column 1 
 tmp[4] = XtimeE(state[4]) ^ XtimeB(state[5]) ^ XtimeD(state[6]) ^ 
Xtime9(state[7]); 
 tmp[9] = Xtime9(state[4]) ^ XtimeE(state[5]) ^ XtimeB(state[6]) ^ 
XtimeD(state[7]); 
 tmp[14] = XtimeD(state[4]) ^ Xtime9(state[5]) ^ XtimeE(state[6]) ^ 
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XtimeB(state[7]); 
 tmp[3] = XtimeB(state[4]) ^ XtimeD(state[5]) ^ Xtime9(state[6]) ^ 
XtimeE(state[7]); 
 
 // restore column 2 
 tmp[8] = XtimeE(state[8]) ^ XtimeB(state[9]) ^ XtimeD(state[10]) ^ 
Xtime9(state[11]); 
 tmp[13] = Xtime9(state[8]) ^ XtimeE(state[9]) ^ XtimeB(state[10]) ^ 
XtimeD(state[11]); 
 tmp[2]  = XtimeD(state[8]) ^ Xtime9(state[9]) ^ XtimeE(state[10]) ^ 
XtimeB(state[11]); 
 tmp[7]  = XtimeB(state[8]) ^ XtimeD(state[9]) ^ Xtime9(state[10]) ^ 
XtimeE(state[11]); 
 
 // restore column 3 
 tmp[12] = XtimeE(state[12]) ^ XtimeB(state[13]) ^ XtimeD(state[14]) ^ 
Xtime9(state[15]); 
 tmp[1] = Xtime9(state[12]) ^ XtimeE(state[13]) ^ XtimeB(state[14]) ^ 
XtimeD(state[15]); 
 tmp[6] = XtimeD(state[12]) ^ Xtime9(state[13]) ^ XtimeE(state[14]) ^ 
XtimeB(state[15]); 
 tmp[11] = XtimeB(state[12]) ^ XtimeD(state[13]) ^ Xtime9(state[14]) ^ 
XtimeE(state[15]); 
 
 for( i=0; i < 4 * Nb; i++ ) 
  state[i] = InvSbox(tmp[i]); 
} 
 
// encrypt/decrypt columns of the key 
// n.b. you can replace this with 
//      byte-wise xor if you wish. 
 
void AddRoundKey (unsigned *state, unsigned *key) 
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{ 
 int idx; 
 
 for( idx = 0; idx < 4; idx++ ) 
  state[idx] ^= key[idx]; 
} 
 
unsigned char Rcon[11] = {0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x04, 0x08, 0x10, 0x20, 0x40, 0x80, 
0x1b, 0x36}; 
 
// produce Nb bytes for each round 
void ExpandKey (unsigned char *key, unsigned char *expkey) 
{ 
 unsigned char tmp0, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3, tmp4; 
 unsigned idx; 
 
 memcpy (expkey, key, Nk * 4); 
 
 for( idx = Nk; idx < Nb * (Nr + 1); idx++ ) { 
  tmp0 = expkey[4*idx - 4]; 
  tmp1 = expkey[4*idx - 3]; 
  tmp2 = expkey[4*idx - 2]; 
  tmp3 = expkey[4*idx - 1]; 
  if( !(idx % Nk) ) { 
   tmp4 = tmp3; 
   tmp3 = Sbox(tmp0); 
   tmp0 = Sbox(tmp1) ^ Rcon[idx/Nk]; 
   tmp1 = Sbox(tmp2); 
   tmp2 = Sbox(tmp4); 
  } else if( Nk > 6 && idx % Nk == 4 ) { 
   tmp0 = Sbox(tmp0); 
   tmp1 = Sbox(tmp1); 
   tmp2 = Sbox(tmp2); 
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   tmp3 = Sbox(tmp3); 
  } 
 
  expkey[4*idx+0] = expkey[4*idx - 4*Nk + 0] ^ tmp0; 
  expkey[4*idx+1] = expkey[4*idx - 4*Nk + 1] ^ tmp1; 
  expkey[4*idx+2] = expkey[4*idx - 4*Nk + 2] ^ tmp2; 
  expkey[4*idx+3] = expkey[4*idx - 4*Nk + 3] ^ tmp3; 
 } 
} 
 
// encrypt one 128 bit block 
void Encrypt (unsigned char *in, unsigned char *expkey, unsigned char *out) 
{ 
 unsigned char state[Nb * 4]; 
 unsigned round; 
 
 memcpy (state, in, Nb * 4); 
 AddRoundKey ((unsigned *)state, (unsigned *)expkey); 
 
 for( round = 1; round < Nr + 1; round++ ) { 
  if( round < Nr ) 
   MixSubColumns (state); 
  else 
   ShiftRows (state); 
 
  AddRoundKey ((unsigned *)state, (unsigned *)expkey + round * Nb); 
 } 
 
 memcpy (out, state, sizeof(state)); 
} 
 
void Decrypt (unsigned char *in, unsigned char *expkey, unsigned char *out) 
{ 
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 unsigned char state[Nb * 4]; 
 unsigned round; 
 
 memcpy (state, in, sizeof(state)); 
 
 AddRoundKey ((unsigned *)state, (unsigned *)expkey + Nr * Nb); 
 InvShiftRows(state); 
 
 for( round = Nr; round--; ) 
 { 
  AddRoundKey ((unsigned *)state, (unsigned *)expkey + round * Nb); 
  if( round ) 
   InvMixSubColumns (state); 
 }  
 
 memcpy (out, state, sizeof(state)); 
} 
 
#define USR UCSRA 
 
void printP (PGM_P string){ 
        char c; 
        c=pgm_read_byte(string); 
                   while (c) { 
                   loop_until_bit_is_set(USR, UDRE); 
                   UDR = c; 
                   c=pgm_read_byte(++string); 
                   } 
                   return; 
                 } 
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void print (const char *string){ 
                   while (*string) { 
                   loop_until_bit_is_set(USR, UDRE); 
                   UDR = *string++; 
                   } 
                   return; 
                 } 
 
void scan(char *string){ 
char c; 
        do      { 
                do { 
                        loop_until_bit_is_set(USR, RXC); 
                        c =UDR; 
                        } while bit_is_set(USR, FE); 
                *string++ = c; 
                //echo the character 
                loop_until_bit_is_set(USR, UDRE); 
                UDR = c; 
                } while ( c != '\r' ); 
        loop_until_bit_is_set(USR, UDRE); 
        UDR = '\n'; 
        string[-1]=0; 
        } 
 
void UART_init(void)      // initialize USART 
{ 
 UBRRH = 0;  
 UBRRL = 103; // 8MHz, Baudrate: 9600 
 UCSRA = (1<<U2X); 
 UCSRB = (1<<TXEN)|(1<<RXEN); 
 UCSRC = (1<<URSEL)|(1<<UCSZ0)|(1<<UCSZ1)|(1<<USBS); 
} 
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#define itoa10(N,S) itoa(N,S,10) 
#define itoa16(N,S) itoa(N,S,16) 
 
//DEMO 
 
unsigned char sampleout[16]; 
 
unsigned char samplekey[] = {0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6, 0xab, 
0xf7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c}; 
 
unsigned char samplein[] = {0x32, 0x43, 0xf6, 0xa8, 0x88, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x8d, 0x31, 
0x31, 0x98, 0xa2, 0xe0, 0x37, 0x07, 0x34}; 
 
int main(void) 
{ 
 UART_init(); 
  
 unsigned char expkey[4 * Nb * (Nr + 1)]; 
 unsigned char i; 
 char c[8]; 
 
 printP(PSTR("Original: ")); 
 for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) {itoa16(samplein[i],c);print(c); print(" ");} 
 printP(PSTR("\n")); 
 
 ExpandKey (samplekey, expkey); 
 Encrypt (samplein, expkey, sampleout); 
 
 printP(PSTR("Encrypted: ")); 
 for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) {itoa16(sampleout[i],c);print(c); print(" ");} 
 printP(PSTR("\n")); 
 
98 
 
 Decrypt (sampleout, expkey, samplein); 
 
 printP(PSTR("Decrypted: ")); 
 
 for( i = 0; i < 16; i++ ) {itoa16(samplein[i],c);print(c); print(" ");} 
 printP(PSTR("\n")); 
} 
 
